Inconsistencies

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The TLS ClientHello is produced by the client's TLS library and is far harder to forge than a User-Agent header. This fingerprint's dominant community label is a non-browser tool, so the browser claim contradicts the wire.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Chrome. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The cipher suites match Chrome, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The cipher suites match Firefox, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The cipher suites match Firefox, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The cipher suites match Firefox, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The cipher suites match Firefox, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The cipher suites match Firefox, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The cipher suites match Firefox, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The cipher suites match Firefox, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The cipher suites match Firefox, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The cipher suites match Firefox, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The cipher suites match Firefox, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The cipher suites match Firefox, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Safari. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The cipher suites match Firefox, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The cipher suites match Firefox, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Safari. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The cipher suites match Firefox, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The cipher suites match Firefox, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The cipher suites match Firefox, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Chrome. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The cipher suites match Chrome, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The cipher suites match Firefox, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The cipher suites match Firefox, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The cipher suites match Chrome, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The cipher suites match Chrome, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Chrome. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The cipher suites match Firefox, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The cipher suites match Chrome, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The cipher suites match Firefox, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Safari. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Safari. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The cipher suites match Chrome, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The cipher suites match Firefox, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The cipher suites match Chrome, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The cipher suites match Chrome, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The cipher suites match Firefox, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Edge. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The cipher suites match Firefox, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The cipher suites match Firefox, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Safari. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Safari. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Safari. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The cipher suites match Firefox, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The cipher suites match Firefox, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Edge. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Edge. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The cipher suites match Safari, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The cipher suites match Firefox, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The cipher suites match Firefox, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The cipher suites match Firefox, but the extension set or signature algorithms differ from every capture even after normalizing handshake-variant extensions. Most likely a field-trial, ECH, or build variant the catalog has not captured; occasionally mimicry. This sharpens as catalog coverage grows.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Safari. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The offered TLS cipher suites match no controlled capture of Firefox. Cipher lists are very stable per browser, so a different one is a real inconsistency — though a TLS-inspecting proxy re-originating the handshake is an honest cause, which holds this at medium.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.

The initial TTL is set by the sending kernel (64 on Unix-like systems, 128 on Windows) and survives NAT. But VPNs, proxies and tunnels legitimately replace the sending stack, so this check never exceeds medium confidence.